0003: Identity headers count only from known peers¶
Status: accepted ยท Reviewed: 2026-10-31
Context¶
X-Request-ID, traceparent and X-Forwarded-For are set by whoever sends the request. If they were accepted from anyone, a client could:
- choose the request ID that appears in your logs, or reuse another request's ID;
- attach its request to someone else's trace;
- make the logs show any client IP it likes.
Decision¶
- Request ID and
traceparentare taken from the request only when the direct peer is inOBS_TRUSTED_CIDRS(context.py:33). By default that's the private ranges plus loopback. Otherwise a new request ID is generated. - Client IP comes from
X-Forwarded-Foronly whenOBS_HONOR_FORWARDED_HEADERS=true. The hops are read right to left, and the first address that isn't a trusted proxy is the client (proxies.py:28). Proxies append to the header, so only the right-hand entries are written by servers you control. - The runtime control plane uses the same check, so it can't be reached through a public ingress (
control_plane.py:125).
Evidence¶
- A spoofing bug, fixed in 1.5.0. Until 1.5.0, the logged client IP was the leftmost
X-Forwarded-Forentry, which the client controls, so clients could log any IP they chose (b580060). - Tests:
What it cost¶
- Request IDs from an untrusted proxy are ignored. If your edge proxy is outside the default ranges, its request IDs don't count until you add it to
OBS_TRUSTED_CIDRS. It's the most likely surprise on day one. - The defaults trust every private address. In a shared network that includes machines you don't control. Narrow the list in production.
- With forwarded headers honoured,
OBS_TRUSTED_CIDRSmust list only your proxies. The library logs a warning when the setting is on.